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Heterogeneous Labor, Minimum Hiring 
Standards, and Job Vacancies in 
Public Employment 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
University ofMassachusetts, Amherst 
I. Introduction 
The existence of substantial, persistent, and widespread job vacancies 
or shortages among certain classes of urban government employees is 
well established, with attention recently being focused on shortages of 
policemen and registered nurses.1 Several authors have attempted to 
explain this phenomenon by postulating that local governments can be 
considered as monopsonists in the markets for job classes for which they 
are large employers.2 As is well known, a monopsony structure implies 
that job vacancies will be observed. 
Although a government employer may be the only employer of a 
particular class of employees in an area (say firemen), it does not neces- 
sarily follow that the government agency possesses monopsony power, as 
current or potential employees can find employment in alternative 
occupations in the private sector. Moreover, a model is presented in this 
paper that indicates that the existence of persistent vacancy rates for a 
class of employees is compatible with there being a greater number of 
applicants than there are positions, at a wage rate that is predetermined 
either through a legislative process or collective bargaining. In particular, 
if applicants vary in quality, then under certain conditions a rational 
Research was partially supported by a grant from the Manpower Administration, 
1> . Department of Labor. I am grateful to Richard Kihlstrom and a referee for their 
comments on an earlier version. 
I See, for example, Devine (1969, 1970), Altman (1970), Moskow (1970), and Yett 
(1970). 
2 See Devine (1969, 1970), Altman (1970), and Yett (1970). 
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government employer will choose to employ fewer employees than his 
assumed predetermined authorized employment level. That is, the 
employer will choose an optimal equilibrium positive vacancy rate. 
As might be expected a priori, the vacancy rate that results from 
our model is a function both of the "value" of the public service to the 
community and the cost of public employees. However, contrary to the 
implications of the textbook monopsony model, it is shown that increasing 
the wage rates of public employees may actually increase rather than 
decrease observed vacancy rates. Thus, on the theoretical evel, it is not 
at all clear that increasing the wages of public employees (relative to those 
in the private sector) is the appropriate way to reduce urban government 
manpower shortages. 
After developing the model in the next section, we apply it in an attempt 
to explain variations in vacancy rates across police departments for a 
sample of over 400 United States cities in 1967. Preliminary evidence on 
the wage-vacancy relationship is obtained, and it appears that empirically 
one can also not conclude that increasing the wages of public employees 
would help to reduce manpower shortages in urban governments. 
II. A Model of Equilibrium Job Vacancies3 
We assume that either through a political process or by some other means 
a governmental agency is allocated an authorized employment level and, 
abstracting from the internal wage structure, informed of the fixed 
wage rate per employee that they can pay. At this exogenously deter- 
mined wage, the agency is assumed to attract more potential applicants 
than it has authorized vacant positions. Suppose the quality level of 
applicants varies, and the recruitment division must accept or reject each 
applicant as he presents himself, rather than cumulating all applicants 
and then selecting the best. Given a stochastic distribution of applicants 
by quality, one approach that the decision makers can follow is to choose 
a set of minimum hiring standards or a minimum acceptable quality level, 
so as to maximize the expected net gain to society. Implicitly and ration- 
ally, this approach may create an expected positive number of vacancies.4 
3 The analysis presented below draws heavily on the methodology used by Mortensen 
(1970) and several papers in the Phelps (1970) volume. 
4 This type of approach seems to be quite similar to that which is often followed by 
government agencies. For example, consider the situation in which all applicants who 
achieve above a specified minimum score on an examination are placed on an "appoint- 
ment list" with the order of appointments to be based upon test scores. A persistent 
positive queue of acceptable applicants can be thought of as negative "vacancies" in this 
context. Note also that an implication of this approach is that publicized minimum 
standards may discourage some applicants from applying; consequently, the observed 
number of applicants is not a good measure of the potential number of applicants that the 
agency faces at the specified wage rate. 
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More specifically, we consider for simplicity a single-period model in 
which labor turnover is ignored. We also ignore the possibility of altering 
the quality distribution of applicants either by recruiting expenditures 
or by training expenditures once an applicant is employed. Let W and E 
denote, respectively, the specified wage rate anid authorized employment 
level given from the political process, and let P denote the value per unit 
of the public service to society. 
Applicants are assumed to be heterogeneous with qi (where 0 < 
qi ? 1) being the service flow from the ith applicant. Although the quality 
of each applicant can be ascertained with certainty once he presents 
himself the flow of applicants to the recruiting office is a random variable 
with distribution f (q). Given this situation, suppose q* is designated as 
the minimum acceptable quality level. That is, all applicants exceeding 
this minimum hiring standard will be employed; all others will be 
rejected. Then the expected quality of an accepted applicant is given by 
A(q*), where 
J* qf (q) d A(q*) = q dq and A'(q*) > 0. (1) 
f' ff(q) dq 
Let M be the total number of applicants to the agency. This number 
is assumed to be greater than the number of available positions, assumed 
here to be the entire authorized employment level (E). The probability 
that any one of these applicants meets the minimum quality standard 
q* is then 
n(q*) = {f(q). (2) 
Jq* 
The number of applicants who satisfy this standard, X, is thus a 
random variable distributed binomially with expectation n(q*)M. Let 
B(X, n, M) denote the relevant binomial probability density function.5 
Then the number actually employed, Y, is a random variable such that 
X, if X < E, (3) 
El if X> E. 
The agency's expected employment level, N, is therefore given by 
E E 
N = XB[X, n(q*), M] + E I - 2 B[x, n(q* ), M] (4) 0 0 
An increase in the minimum acceptable quality level, q*, obviously 
decreases the probability n(q*) that any applicant will meet the standard. 
Crucially one can show that a decrease in this probability leads to a 
5 Where B(X, n, M) = ( X) n )X(1 
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decrease in the expected employment level.6 Hence, increases in the 
minimum acceptable quality level cause expected employment to 
decrease: 
N'(q*) < 0. (5) 
The expected value of the net gain to society from employing the 
particular class of public employees is given by 
G = PA(q*)N(q*) + VW[E - N(q*)]. (6) 
The first term represents the expected value of the public service, 
the expected number of "quality units" of public employees [A(q*)N(q*)] 
multiplied by the value per unit. The second term represents the value 
to society of funds that can be utilized elsewhere because all of the agency's 
authorized positions are not filled. This is equal to the expected number 
of vacant positions (E - N) multiplied by the wage cost per man and 
the value to society of a dollar spent in alternative uses (V). Note that 
equation (6) can be rewritten 
G = [PA(q*) - WV]N(q*) + WVE. (6a) 
With the equation rewritten in this manner, it is clear that the term in 
brackets represents the expected net value to society of each employee 
that the agency hires. Consequently, in order for any employees to be 
hired, the term in brackets must be positive for some value of q*. 
If we assume that an interior solution exists, the first-order necessary 
condition to maximize equation (6a) requires that the minimum accept- 
able quality level be chosen to satisfy 
[PA(q*) - WV]N'(q*) + PA'(q*)N(q*) = 0. (7) 
The interpretation of this condition is straightforward. An increase in 
the minimum acceptable quality level increases the expected quality 
level, and hence the expected net value of the service flow per man of 
those applicants accepted. On the other hand, it results in a decrease in 
the expected number of acceptable applicants. The agency must choose 
the minimum quality level such that the net impact of these two effects 
is to maximize the expected value of the net gain to society. 
Totally differentiating equation (7) and making use of the second-order 
necessary condition for equation (7) to have yielded a local maximum, 
we find that7 
as>O. e < O. a > O. (8) 
8W aP eV 
6 A formal proof of this proposition isavailable on request. I am indebted to Richard 
Kihlstrom for helping to construct the proof. 
7 The second-order necessary condition is that B(q*) = [PA(q*) - WV]N"(q*) + 
2PA'(q*)N'(q*) + PA"(q*)N(q) < 0. Furthermore, aq*/aW = VN'(q*)JB(q*) > 0, 
aq*IaP = -A(q*)N'(q*)/B(q*) < 0, aq*Ia V = WN'(q*)/B(q*) > 0. 
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That is, an increase in the wage cost of public employees or the value 
of funds in alternative uses, ceteris paribus, leads to increases in the min- 
imum acceptable quality level, while an increase in the value per unit 
of the public service leads to a decrease. The rationale for these effects 
should be obvious and need not be discussed here. 
The minimum acceptable quality level is not directly observable. In 
practice it may consist of a vector of hiring standards such as educational 
requirements, physical and mental health characteristics, test scores, 
and residence requirements. Note, however, that the agency's expected 
vacancy rate is given by 
mR = 1I () (9) 
Differentiating equation (8) with respect to each parameter then yields 
directly [since N'(q*) < 0]: 
AVR 0 0 VR 0 V 0 RV 0 (IR) 
a W aPa EV 
An increase in the wage cost of public employees or the value of funds 
in alternative uses and a decrease in the value per unit of the public 
service all lead to an increase in the expected vacancy rate. Crucially, 
then, increasing the wages of public employees to reduce the number 
of vacancies would be a self-defeating policy. 
If the government agency does have monopsony power in the market 
for its potential employees, this conclusion must, of course, be modified. 
In the context of our model, monopsony power reflects either the number 
of applicants to the agency increasing or the quality distribution of the 
applicants shifting upward in response to a ceteris paribus increase in the 
agency wage.8 While the net impact of these two effects may be to decrease 
the expected vacancy rate when the agency wage increases, a priori 
there is no reason to conclude that the net impact of these effects plus 
the previously discussed one would be negative. Hence, until empirical 
evidence is presented on the net relationship between public employees' 
wages and vacancy rates, there should be no presumption that increasing 
the wages of public employees would prove to be an effective method of 
reducing the number of job vacancies in public sector agencies. 
8 Throughout, we continue to assume that the wage rate is predetermined and is not 
necessarily equal to that wage which a profit-maximizing monopsonist would choose. 
Thus it remains meaningful to speak of increasing the wage rate. 
The quality distribution of applicants could shift, without the number of applicants 
changing, if the increase in high-quality applicants is offset by a decrease in the number 
of previously low-quality applicants. The latter group may withdraw from potential 
applicant status when they observe the higher minimum standards that accompany an 
increase in the wage rate. 
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III. Empirical Analysis 
This section presents preliminary evidence on the public employee 
wage-vacancy relationship as we apply the model of the previous section 
in an attempt to explain variations in vacancy rates across police depart- 
ments for a sample of over 400 United States cities in 1967.9 Table 1 
presents the results of regressions in which two measures of the depart- 
ment vacancy rate were regressed on several alternative measures of the 
wage costs of police, a measure of the frequency of recruitment, and 
several sociodemographic variables designed to act as proxy variables for 
the values to the community of police services and of funds in alternative 
uses. The sociodemographic variables are included primarily as control 
variables. Since in most cases they would be expected to have similar 
impacts on the value of police protection and the value of other services 
(e.g., fire protection), we cannot a priori predict the signs that their 
coefficients should have.'0 Given the crude nature of the data, the results 
presented here should also be considered only suggestive. 
Equations (1)-(4) utilize as a dependent variable VI, a dichotomous 
variable that takes on the value of unity if the police department is below 
authorized strength, and zero otherwise." Inasmuch as some vacancies 
are caused by disequilibrium phenomena and some are caused by positions 
being authorized but not funded, it is not surprising that the explanatory 
power of the estimated equations is quite low (with R2 less than .1 in 
all cases). Nevertheless, the calculated F-statistics indicate that statistically 
significant relationships exist between the dependent and independent 
variables. Furthermore, regardless of whether we use as the measure of 
wage costs the police patrolmen's entrance salary (WI), average annual 
earnings of police department employees (W2), or the analogous variables 
adjusted for city price level differences (W3 and W4), we observe a 
significant positive relationship between the vacancy dummy variable 
9 The sample consists of 419 cities with population greater than 25,000, for which 
police department vacancy data were reported in the 1967 Municipal Year Book. Over 
75 percent of the cities in the sample reported that their police departments were below 
authorized strength, with the mean vacancy rate across all of the cities being over 5 
percent. 
IO The city crime index might appear to be a good proxy for the value of police 
services. However, this may be simultaneously determined with the police vacancy 
rate, and the accuracy of crime reporting varies widely across cities. 
I1 The customary disclaimers that: (a) the qualitative nature of the dependent variable 
implies that the disturbances will be heteroskedastic, and hence the estimates are not 
minimum-variance stimates; (b) the predicted values of the dependent variable may fall 
outside the (0, 1) range; and (c) the disturbances are nonnormal, hence the significance 
tests should be considered only as heuristic tests, are all applicable here. In addition to 
the results present below, regressions in which all variables were in linear form were also 
estimated, and the results differ only marginally from those reported in the paper. 
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and police wage costs.' 2 Ceterls paribus, the higher the wage, the greater 
the probability that the police department will have vacancies. 
Equations (5)-(8) utilize V2, the actual police department vacancy 
rate, as the dependent variable. I 3In contrast to the results above, here 
we observe either a negative relationship between the wage level and 
vacancy rate (W1 and W3) or an insignificant positive one (W2 and 
W4). Given the contradictory nature of the two sets of results, it is clear 
that one should not claim that the available evidence indicates that 
increasing police employees' wages would unambiguously reduce police 
department vacancy rates. 14 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper has presented an alternative explanation, based upon a 
stochastic quality distribution of applicants, for the existence of job 
vacancies or shortages among public employees. Contrary to the implica- 
tion derived from the textbook monopsony model, increasing the wages 
of public employees, a priori, would not necessarily prove to be an effective 
means of reducing these shortages. Empirical estimation of the relationship 
between police wages and police department vacancies in 1967 for a 
sample of 419 United States cities lends support to this conclusion. 
12 The money wage variables were adjusted for city price level differences using an 
estimated city price level variable, developed by the author, that is based upon the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Indexes of Comparative Living Costs for 44 metropolitan 
and nonmetropolitan areas (U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1970). Details of the 
variable's construction are available from the author. 
13 In addition, equations (5)-(8) were estimated for the subset of cities with positive 
vacancy rates to avoid potential biases due to the significant number of zero vacancy 
observations (Goldberger 1964, p. 252). The results, however, were virtually identical 
with those reported in the text. Equations (5)-(8) were also reestimated using a dependent 
variable which assumed that all police department vacancies occur among uniformed 
employees, i.e., an estimate of the vacancy rate among uniformed employees. Again the 
results were virtually identical with those reported. 
14 For brevity, since they are not our central concern, we have omitted all discussion 
of the coefficients of the nonwage variables. In any case, most do not have unambiguous 
interpretations. 
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